

**AMENDMENT TO RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 117-**

**54**

**OFFERED BY MR. MEEKS OF NEW YORK**

Page 1348, after line 23, insert the following:

**1 TITLE LVIX—BURMA ACT OF 2022**

**2 SEC. 5901. SHORT TITLE.**

3 This title may be cited as the “Burma Unified  
4 through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2022” or  
5 the “BURMA Act of 2022”.

**6 SEC. 5902. DEFINITIONS.**

7 In this title:

8 (1) BURMESE MILITARY.—The term “Burmese  
9 military”—

10 (A) means the Armed Forces of Burma,  
11 including the army, navy, and air force; and

12 (B) includes security services under the  
13 control of the Armed Forces of Burma such as  
14 the police and border guards.

15 (2) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.—The term  
16 “crimes against humanity” includes the following,  
17 when committed as part of a widespread or system-  
18 atic attack directed against any civilian population,  
19 with knowledge of the attack:

1 (A) Murder.

2 (B) Forced transfer of population.

3 (C) Torture.

4 (D) Extermination.

5 (E) Enslavement.

6 (F) Rape, sexual slavery, or any other  
7 form of sexual violence of comparable severity.

8 (G) Enforced disappearance of persons.

9 (H) Persecution against any identifiable  
10 group or collectivity on political, racial, na-  
11 tional, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or  
12 other grounds that are universally recognized as  
13 impermissible under international law.

14 (I) Imprisonment or other severe depriv-  
15 ation of physical liberty in violation of funda-  
16 mental rules of international law.

17 (3) EXECUTIVE ORDER 14014.—The term “Ex-  
18 ecutive Order 14014” means Executive Order 14014  
19 (86 Fed. Reg. 9429; relating to blocking property  
20 with respect to the situation in Burma).

21 (4) GENOCIDE.—The term “genocide” means  
22 any offense described in section 1091(a) of title 18,  
23 United States Code.

24 (5) TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE.—The term “tran-  
25 sitional justice” means the range of judicial, non-

1       judicial, formal, informal, retributive, and restorative  
2       measures employed by countries transitioning out of  
3       armed conflict or repressive regimes, or employed by  
4       the international community through international  
5       justice mechanisms, to redress past or ongoing  
6       atrocities and to promote long-term, sustainable  
7       peace.

8               (6) WAR CRIME.—The term “war crime” has  
9       the meaning given the term in section 2441(c) of  
10      title 18, United States Code.

11   **Subtitle A—Matters Relating to the**  
12                   **Conflict in Burma**

13   **SEC. 5911. FINDINGS.**

14      Congress makes the following findings:

15           (1) Since 1988, the United States policy of  
16      principled engagement has fostered positive demo-  
17      cratic reforms in Burma, with elections in 2010,  
18      2015, and 2020, helping to bring about the partial  
19      transition to civilian rule and with the latter 2 elec-  
20      tions resulting in resounding electoral victories for  
21      the National League for Democracy.

22           (2) That democratic transition remained incom-  
23      plete, with the military retaining significant power  
24      and independence from civilian control following the  
25      2015 elections, including through control of 25 per-

1 cent of parliamentary seats, a de facto veto over con-  
2 stitutional reform, authority over multiple govern-  
3 ment ministries, and the ability to operate with im-  
4 punity and no civilian oversight.

5 (3) Despite some improvements with respect for  
6 human rights and fundamental freedoms beginning  
7 in 2010, and the establishment of a quasi-civilian  
8 government following credible elections in 2015,  
9 Burma's military leaders have, since 2016, overseen  
10 an increase in restrictions to freedom of expression  
11 (including for members of the press), freedom of  
12 peaceful assembly, freedom of association, and free-  
13 dom of religion or belief.

14 (4) On August 25, 2017, Burmese military and  
15 security forces launched a genocidal military cam-  
16 paign against Rohingya, resulting in a mass exodus  
17 of some 750,000 Rohingya from Burma's Rakhine  
18 State into Bangladesh, where they remain. The mili-  
19 tary has since taken no steps to improve conditions  
20 for Rohingya still in Rakhine State, who remain at  
21 high risk of genocide and other atrocities, or to cre-  
22 ate conditions conducive to the voluntary return of  
23 Rohingya refugees and other internally displaced  
24 persons (IDPs).

1           (5) The Burmese military has also engaged in  
2 renewed violence with other ethnic minority groups  
3 across the country. The military has continued to  
4 commit atrocities in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, and  
5 Shan. Fighting in northern Burma has forced more  
6 than 100,000 people from their homes and into  
7 camps for internally displaced persons. The Burmese  
8 military continues to heavily proscribe humanitarian  
9 and media access to conflict-affected populations  
10 across the country.

11           (6) With more nearly \$470,000,000 in humani-  
12 tarian assistance in response to the crisis in fiscal  
13 year 2021, the United States is the largest humani-  
14 tarian donor to populations in need as a result of  
15 conflicts in Burma. In May 2021, the United States  
16 announced nearly \$155,000,000 in additional hu-  
17 manitarian assistance to meet the urgent needs of  
18 Rohingya refugees and host communities in Ban-  
19 gladesh and people affected by ongoing violence in  
20 Burma's Rakhine, Kachin, Shan, and Chin states.  
21 In September 2021, the United States provided  
22 nearly \$180,000,000 in additional critical humani-  
23 tarian assistance to the people of Burma, bringing  
24 the total fiscal year 2021 to more than  
25 \$434,000,000.

1           (7) Both government- and military-initiated in-  
2           vestigations into human rights abuses in Burma in-  
3           volving violence between ethnic minorities and Bur-  
4           mese security forces have failed to yield credible re-  
5           sults or hold perpetrators accountable.

6           (8) In its report dated September 17, 2018, the  
7           United Nations Independent International Fact-  
8           Finding Mission on Myanmar concluded, on reason-  
9           able grounds, that the factors allowing inference of  
10          “genocidal intent” are present with respect to the  
11          attacks against Rohingya in Rakhine State, and acts  
12          by Burmese security forces against Rohingya in  
13          Rakhine State and other ethnic minorities in Kachin  
14          and Shan States amount to “crimes against human-  
15          ity” and “war crimes”. The Independent Inter-  
16          national Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar estab-  
17          lished by the United Nations Human Rights Council  
18          recommended that the United Nations Security  
19          Council “should ensure accountability for crimes  
20          under international law committed in Myanmar,  
21          preferably by referring the situation to the Inter-  
22          national Criminal Court or alternatively by creating  
23          an ad hoc international criminal tribunal”. The Mis-  
24          sion also recommended the imposition of targeted

1 economic sanctions, including an arms embargo on  
2 Burma.

3 (9) On December 13, 2018, the United States  
4 House of Representatives passed House Resolution  
5 1091 (115th Congress), which expressed the sense of  
6 the House that “the atrocities committed against the  
7 Rohingya by the Burmese military and security  
8 forces since August 2017 constitute crimes against  
9 humanity and genocide” and called upon the Sec-  
10 retary of State to review the available evidence and  
11 make a similar determination.

12 (10) In a subsequent report dated August 5,  
13 2019, the United Nations Independent International  
14 Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar found that the  
15 Burmese military’s economic interests “enable its  
16 conduct” and that it benefits from and supports ex-  
17 tractive industry businesses operating in conflict-af-  
18 fected areas in northern Burma, including natural  
19 resources, particularly oil and gas, minerals and  
20 gems and argued that “through controlling its own  
21 business empire, the Tatmadaw can evade the ac-  
22 countability and oversight that normally arise from  
23 civilian oversight of military budgets”. The report  
24 called for the United Nations and individual govern-  
25 ments to place targeted sanctions on all senior offi-

1 cials in the Burmese military as well as their eco-  
2 nomic interests, especially Myanma Economic Hold-  
3 ings Limited and Myanmar Economic Corporation.

4 (11) Burma's November 2020 election resulted  
5 in a landslide victory for the National League of De-  
6 mocracy, with the National League for Democracy  
7 winning a large majority of seats in Burma's na-  
8 tional parliament. The elections were judged to be  
9 credible, and marked an important step in the coun-  
10 try's democratic transition.

11 (12) On February 1, 2021, the Burmese mili-  
12 tary conducted a coup d'état, declaring a year-long  
13 state of emergency and detaining State Counsellor  
14 Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and doz-  
15 ens of other government officials and elected mem-  
16 bers of parliament, thus derailing Burma's transi-  
17 tion to democracy and disregarding the will of the  
18 people of Burma as expressed in the November 2020  
19 general elections, which were determined to be cred-  
20 ible by international and national observers.

21 (13) Following the coup, some ousted members  
22 of parliament established the Committee Rep-  
23 resenting the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which  
24 subsequently established the National Unity Consult-  
25 ative Council in March of 2021. The National Unity



1 Consultative Council includes representatives from a  
2 broad spectrum of stakeholders in Burma opposed to  
3 the military and the coup: elected representatives  
4 from the CRPH, representatives from the ethnic  
5 armed organizations, members of Burma's civil dis-  
6 obedience movement, and other anti-coup forces.

7 (14) The CRPH subsequently released the Fed-  
8 eral Democracy Charter in March 2021 and estab-  
9 lished the National Unity Government in April 2021.  
10 The National Unity Government includes represent-  
11 atives from ethnic minority groups, civil society or-  
12 ganizations, women's groups, leaders of the civil dis-  
13 obedience movement, and others.

14 (15) Since the coup on February 1, 2021, the  
15 Burmese military has—

16 (A) used lethal force on peaceful protestors  
17 on multiple occasions, killing more than 2,000  
18 people, including more than 142 children;

19 (B) detained more than 10,000 peaceful  
20 protestors, participants in the Civil Disobe-  
21 dience Movement, labor leaders, government of-  
22 ficials and elected members of parliament,  
23 members of the media, and others, according to  
24 the Assistance Association for Political Pris-  
25 oners;

1 (C) issued laws and directives used to fur-  
2 ther impede fundamental freedoms, including  
3 freedom of expression (including for members  
4 of the press), freedom of peaceful assembly, and  
5 freedom of association; and

6 (D) imposed restrictions on the internet  
7 and telecommunications.

8 (16) According to the UNHCR, more than  
9 758,000 people have been internally displaced since  
10 the coup, while an estimated 40,000 have sought ref-  
11 uge in neighboring countries. Nevertheless, the Bur-  
12 mese military continues to block humanitarian as-  
13 sistance to populations in need. According to the  
14 World Health Organization, the military has carried  
15 out more than 286 attacks on health care entities  
16 since the coup and killed at least 30 health workers.  
17 Dozens more have been arbitrarily detained, and  
18 hundreds have warrants out for their arrest. The  
19 military continued such attacks even as they inhib-  
20 ited efforts to combat a devastating third wave of  
21 COVID-19. The brutality of the Burmese military  
22 was on full display on March 27, 2021, Armed  
23 Forces Day, when, after threatening on state tele-  
24 vision to shoot protesters in the head, security forces  
25 killed more than 150 people.

1           (17) The coup represents a continuation of a  
2           long pattern of violent and anti-democratic behavior  
3           by the military that stretches back decades, with the  
4           military having previously taken over Burma in  
5           coups d'état in 1962 and 1988, and having ignored  
6           the results of the 1990 elections, and a long history  
7           of violently repressing protest movements, including  
8           killing and imprisoning thousands of peaceful  
9           protestors during pro-democracy demonstrations in  
10          1988 and 2007.

11          (18) On February 11, 2021, President Biden  
12          issued Executive Order 14014 in response to the  
13          coup d'état, authorizing sanctions against the Bur-  
14          mese military, its economic interests, and other per-  
15          petrators of the coup.

16          (19) Since the issuance of Executive Order  
17          14014, President Biden has taken several steps to  
18          impose costs on the Burmese military and its leader-  
19          ship, including by designating or otherwise imposing  
20          targeted sanctions with respect to—

21                (A) multiple high-ranking individuals and  
22                their family members, including the Com-  
23                mander-in-Chief of the Burmese military, Min  
24                Aung Hlaing, Burma's Chief of Police, Than  
25                Hlaing, and the Bureau of Special Operations

1 commander, Lieutenant General Aung Soe, and  
2 over 35 other individuals;

3 (B) state-owned and military controlled  
4 companies, including Myanmar Economic Hold-  
5 ings Public Company, Ltd., Myanmar Economic  
6 Corporation, Ltd., Myanmar Economic Hold-  
7 ings Ltd., Myanmar Ruby Enterprise, Myanmar  
8 Imperial Jade Co., Ltd., and Myanmar Gems  
9 Enterprise; and

10 (C) other corporate entities, Burmese mili-  
11 tary units, and Burmese military entities, in-  
12 cluding the military regime's State Administra-  
13 tive Council.

14 (20) The United States has also implemented  
15 new restrictions on exports and reexports to Burma  
16 pursuant to Executive Order 14014; and

17 (21) On April 24, 2021, the Association of  
18 Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed to a five-  
19 point consensus which called for an "immediate ces-  
20 sation of violence", "constructive dialogue among all  
21 parties", the appointment of an ASEAN special  
22 envoy, the provision of humanitarian assistance  
23 through ASEAN's AHA Centre, and a visit by the  
24 ASEAN special envoy to Burma. Except for the ap-  
25 pointment of the Special Envoy in August 2021, the

1 other elements of the ASEAN consensus remain  
2 unimplemented due to obstruction by the Burmese  
3 military.

4 (22) In June 2021, the National Unity Govern-  
5 ment included ethnic minorities and women among  
6 its cabinet and released a policy paper outlining  
7 pledges to Rohingya and calling for “justice and rep-  
8 arations” for the community. The statement affirms  
9 the Rohingya right to citizenship in Burma, a sig-  
10 nificant break from past Burmese government poli-  
11 cies.

12 (23) On March 21, 2022, Secretary of State  
13 Antony Blinken announced that the United States  
14 had concluded that “members of the Burmese mili-  
15 tary committed genocide and crimes against human-  
16 ity against Rohingya”.

17 **SEC. 5912. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

18 It is the policy of the United States—

19 (1) to support genuine democracy, peace, and  
20 national reconciliation in Burma;

21 (2) to pursue a strategy of calibrated engage-  
22 ment, which is essential to support the establishment  
23 of a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma  
24 that includes respect for the human rights of all in-  
25 dividuals regardless of ethnicity and religion;

1           (3) to seek the restoration to power of a civilian  
2       government that reflects the will of the people of  
3       Burma;

4           (4) to support constitutional reforms that en-  
5       sure civilian governance and oversight over the mili-  
6       tary;

7           (5) to assist in the establishment of a fully  
8       democratic, civilian-led, inclusive, and representative  
9       political system that includes free, fair, credible, and  
10      democratic elections in which all people of Burma,  
11      including all ethnic and religious minorities, can par-  
12      ticipate in the political process at all levels including  
13      the right to vote and to run for elected office;

14          (6) to support legal reforms that ensure protec-  
15      tion for the civil and political rights of all individuals  
16      in Burma, including reforms to laws that criminalize  
17      the exercise of human rights and fundamental free-  
18      doms, and strengthening respect for and protection  
19      of human rights, including freedom of religion or be-  
20      lief;

21          (7) to seek the unconditional release of all pris-  
22      oners of conscience and political prisoners in Burma;

23          (8) to strengthen Burma's civilian governmental  
24      institutions, including support for greater trans-

1        parency and accountability once the military is no  
2        longer in power;

3            (9) to empower and resource local communities,  
4        civil society organizations, and independent media;

5            (10) to promote national reconciliation and the  
6        conclusion and credible implementation of a nation-  
7        wide cease-fire agreement, followed by a peace proc-  
8        ess that is inclusive of ethnic Rohingya, Shan,  
9        Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, Karenni, and Karen, and  
10       other ethnic groups and leads to the development of  
11       a political system that effectively addresses natural  
12       resource governance, revenue-sharing, land rights,  
13       and constitutional change enabling inclusive peace;

14           (11) to ensure the protection and non-  
15        refoulement of refugees fleeing Burma to neigh-  
16        boring countries and prioritize efforts to create a  
17        conducive environment and meaningfully address  
18        long-standing structural challenges that undermine  
19        the safety and rights of Rohingya in Rakhine State  
20        as well as members of other ethnic and religious mi-  
21        norities in Burma, including by promoting the cre-  
22        ation of conditions for the dignified, safe, sustain-  
23        able, and voluntary return of refugees in Ban-  
24        gladesh, Thailand, and in the surrounding region  
25        when conditions allow;

1           (12) to support an immediate end to restric-  
2           tions that hinder the freedom of movement of mem-  
3           bers of ethnic minorities throughout the country, in-  
4           cluding Rohingya, and an end to any and all policies  
5           and practices designed to forcibly segregate  
6           Rohingya, and providing humanitarian support for  
7           all internally displaced persons in Burma;

8           (13) to support unfettered access for humani-  
9           tarian actors, media, and human rights mechanisms,  
10          including those established by the United Nations  
11          Human Rights Council and the United Nations Gen-  
12          eral Assembly, to all relevant areas of Burma, in-  
13          cluding Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Shan, and Kayin  
14          States, as well as Sagaing and Magway regions;

15          (14) to call for accountability through inde-  
16          pendent, credible investigations and prosecutions for  
17          any potential genocide, war crimes, and crimes  
18          against humanity, including those involving sexual  
19          and gender-based violence and violence against chil-  
20          dren, perpetrated against ethnic or religious minori-  
21          ties, including Rohingya, by members of the military  
22          and security forces of Burma, and other armed  
23          groups;

24          (15) to encourage reforms toward the military,  
25          security, and police forces operating under civilian



1 control and being held accountable in civilian courts  
2 for human rights abuses, corruption, and other  
3 abuses of power;

4 (16) to promote broad-based, inclusive economic  
5 development and fostering healthy and resilient com-  
6 munities;

7 (17) to combat corruption and illegal economic  
8 activity, including that which involves the military  
9 and its close allies; and

10 (18) to promote responsible international and  
11 regional engagement;

12 (19) to support and advance the strategy of  
13 calibrated engagement, impose targeted sanctions  
14 with respect to the Burmese military's economic in-  
15 terests and major sources of income for the Burmese  
16 military, including with respect to—

17 (A) officials in Burma, including the Com-  
18 mander in Chief of the Armed Forces of  
19 Burma, Min Aung Hlaing, and all individuals  
20 described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of sec-  
21 tion 202(a), under the authorities provided by  
22 title II, Executive Order 14014, and the Global  
23 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act  
24 (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328;  
25 22 U.S.C. 2656 note);

1 (B) enterprises owned or controlled by the  
2 Burmese military, including the Myanmar Eco-  
3 nomic Corporation, Union of Myanmar Eco-  
4 nomic Holding, Ltd., and all other entities de-  
5 scribed in section 202(a)(4), under the authori-  
6 ties provided by title II, the Burmese Freedom  
7 and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–  
8 61; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), the Tom Lantos  
9 Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Demo-  
10 cratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–  
11 286; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), other relevant stat-  
12 utory authorities, and Executive Order 14014;  
13 and

14 (C) state-owned economic enterprises if—  
15 (i) there is a substantial risk of the  
16 Burmese military accessing the accounts of  
17 such an enterprise; and

18 (ii) the imposition of sanctions would  
19 not cause disproportionate harm to the  
20 people of Burma, the restoration of a civil-  
21 ian government in Burma, or the national  
22 interest of the United States; and

23 (20) to ensure that any sanctions imposed with  
24 respect to entities or individuals are carefully tar-  
25 geted to maximize impact on the military and secu-

1        rity forces of Burma and its economic interests while  
2        minimizing impact on the people of Burma, recog-  
3        nizing the calls from the people of Burma for the  
4        United States to take action against the sources of  
5        income for the military and security forces of  
6        Burma.

7        **Subtitle B—Sanctions and Policy**  
8        **Coordination With Respect to**  
9        **Burma**

10       **SEC. 5921. DEFINITIONS.**

11       In this title:

12            (1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms “admitted”  
13        and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in  
14        section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act  
15        (8 U.S.C. 1101).

16            (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
17        TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
18        mittees” means—

19            (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations  
20        and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and  
21        Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

22            (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and  
23        the Committee on Financial Services of the  
24        House of Representatives.

1           (3) CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-  
2 THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms “correspondent ac-  
3 count” and “payable-through account” have the  
4 meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title  
5 31, United States Code.

6           (4) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The  
7 term “foreign financial institution” has the meaning  
8 of that term as determined by the Secretary of the  
9 Treasury by regulation.

10          (5) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-  
11 son” means a person that is not a United States  
12 person.

13          (6) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with  
14 respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,  
15 means that a person has actual knowledge, or should  
16 have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the  
17 result.

18          (7) PERSON.—The term “person” means an in-  
19 dividual or entity.

20          (8) SUPPORT.—The term “support”, with re-  
21 spect to the Burmese military, means to knowingly  
22 have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided fi-  
23 nancial, material, or technological support for, or  
24 goods or services to or in support of the Burmese  
25 military.

1           (9) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
2           “United States person” means—

3                   (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-  
4                   fully admitted to the United States for perma-  
5                   nent residence;

6                   (B) an entity organized under the laws of  
7                   the United States or any jurisdiction within the  
8                   United States, including a foreign branch of  
9                   such an entity; or

10                  (C) any person in the United States.

11 **SEC. 5922. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**  
12 **HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND PERPETRATION**  
13 **OF A COUP IN BURMA.**

14           (a) MANDATORY SANCTIONS.—Not later than 60  
15 days after the enactment of this Act, the President shall  
16 impose the sanctions described in subsection (d) with re-  
17 spect to any foreign person that the President deter-  
18 mines—

19                   (1) knowingly operates as a senior official or in  
20                   a significant capacity in the defense sector of the  
21                   Burmese economy;

22                   (2) leading up to, during, and since the Feb-  
23                   ruary 2021 coup is responsible for or has directly  
24                   and knowingly engaged in—

1 (A) actions or policies that undermine  
2 democratic processes or institutions in Burma;

3 (B) actions or policies that threaten the  
4 peace, security, or stability of Burma;

5 (C) actions or policies that prohibit, limit,  
6 or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression  
7 or assembly by people in Burma, or that limit  
8 access to print, online, or broadcast media in  
9 Burma; or

10 (D) the arbitrary detention or torture of  
11 any person in Burma or other serious human  
12 rights abuse in Burma;

13 (3) is a senior leader of—

14 (A) the Burmese military or security forces  
15 of Burma, or any successor entity to any of  
16 such forces;

17 (B) the State Administration Council, the  
18 military-appointed cabinet at the level of Dep-  
19 uty Minister or higher, or a military-appointed  
20 minister of a Burmese state or region; or

21 (C) an entity that has engaged in any ac-  
22 tivity described in paragraph (2) leading up to,  
23 during, and after the February 2021 coup;

24 (4) knowingly operates—

1 (A) any entity that is a state-owned eco-  
2 nomic enterprise under Burmese law (other  
3 than the entity specified in subsection (c)) that  
4 benefits the Burmese military, including the  
5 Myanma Gems Enterprise; or

6 (B) any entity controlled in whole or in  
7 part by an entity described in subparagraph  
8 (A), or a successor to such an entity, that bene-  
9 fits the Burmese military;

10 (5) knowingly and materially violates, attempts  
11 to violate, conspires to violate, or has caused or at-  
12 tempted to cause a violation of any license, order,  
13 regulation, or prohibition contained in or issued pur-  
14 suant to Executive Order 14014 or this Act;

15 (6) to be a spouse or adult child of any person  
16 described in any of paragraphs (1) through (5); or

17 (7) to be owned or controlled by, and to act for  
18 or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person that  
19 has engaged in the activity described, as the case  
20 may be, in any of paragraphs (1) through (6).

21 (b) ADDITIONAL MEASURE RELATING TO FACILITA-  
22 TION OF TRANSACTIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury  
23 shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, prohibit  
24 or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining  
25 in the United States of a correspondent account or pay-

1 able-through account by a foreign financial institution  
2 that the President determines has, on or after the date  
3 of the enactment of this Act, knowingly conducted or fa-  
4 cilitated a significant transaction or transactions on behalf  
5 of a foreign person sanctioned based on subsection (a).

6 (c) ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.—Beginning on the date  
7 that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this  
8 Act, the President shall impose the sanctions described in  
9 subsection (d) with respect to the Myanmar Oil and Gas  
10 Enterprise.

11 (d) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions that  
12 may be imposed with respect to a foreign person described  
13 in subsection (a) are the following:

14 (1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—Notwithstanding  
15 the requirements of section 202 of the International  
16 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701),  
17 the President may exercise of all powers granted to  
18 the President by that Act to the extent necessary to  
19 block and prohibit all transactions in all property  
20 and interests in property of the foreign person if  
21 such property and interests in property are in the  
22 United States, come within the United States, or are  
23 or come within the possession or control of a United  
24 States person.



1           (2) FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The President may,  
2           pursuant to such regulations as the President may  
3           prescribe, prohibit any transactions in foreign ex-  
4           change that are subject to the jurisdiction of the  
5           United States and in which the foreign person has  
6           any interest.

7           (3) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

8           (A) IN GENERAL.—An alien who the Sec-  
9           retary of State or the Secretary of Homeland  
10          Security (or a designee of one of such Secre-  
11          taries) knows, or has reason to believe, is de-  
12          scribed in subsection (a) is—

13                   (i) inadmissible to the United States;

14                   (ii) ineligible for a visa or other docu-  
15                   mentation to enter the United States; and

16                   (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted  
17                   or paroled into the United States or to re-  
18                   ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-  
19                   tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et  
20                   seq.).

21          (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

22                   (i) IN GENERAL.—The issuing con-  
23                   sular officer, the Secretary of State, or the  
24                   Secretary of Homeland Security (or a des-  
25                   ignee of one of such Secretaries) shall, in

1                   accordance with section 221(i) of the Im-  
2                   migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.  
3                   1201(i)), revoke any visa or other entry  
4                   documentation issued to an alien described  
5                   in clause (i) regardless of when the visa or  
6                   other entry documentation is issued.

7                   (ii) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A rev-  
8                   ocation under subclause (i)—

9                   (I) shall take effect immediately;  
10                  and

11                  (II) shall automatically cancel  
12                  any other valid visa or entry docu-  
13                  mentation that is in the alien's pos-  
14                  session.

15                  (e) EXCEPTIONS.—

16                  (1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW EN-  
17                  FORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVI-  
18                  TIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply  
19                  to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or  
20                  national security activities of the United States.

21                  (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER-  
22                  NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under sub-  
23                  section (d)(3) shall not apply with respect to the ad-  
24                  mission of an alien if admitting or paroling the alien  
25                  into the United States is necessary to permit the

1 United States to comply with the Agreement regard-  
2 ing the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed  
3 at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into  
4 force November 21, 1947, between the United Na-  
5 tions and the United States, or other applicable  
6 international obligations.

7 (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF  
8 GOODS.—

9 (A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and re-  
10 quirements to impose sanctions under this sec-  
11 tion shall not include the authority or require-  
12 ment to impose sanctions on the importation of  
13 goods.

14 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,  
15 the term “good” means any article, natural or  
16 man-made substance, material, supply, or man-  
17 ufactured product, including inspection and test  
18 equipment, and excluding technical data.

19 (4) EXCEPTION RELATING TO THE PROVISION  
20 OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—Sanctions under  
21 this section may not be imposed with respect to  
22 transactions or the facilitation of transactions for—

23 (A) the sale of agricultural commodities,  
24 food, medicine, or medical devices to Burma;

1 (B) the provision of humanitarian assist-  
2 ance to the people of Burma;

3 (C) financial transactions relating to hu-  
4 manitarian assistance or for humanitarian pur-  
5 poses in Burma; or

6 (D) transporting goods or services that are  
7 necessary to carry out operations relating to  
8 humanitarian assistance or humanitarian pur-  
9 poses in Burma.

10 (f) WAIVER.—The President may, on a case-by-case  
11 basis and for periods not to exceed 180 days each, waive  
12 the application of sanctions or restrictions imposed with  
13 respect to a foreign person under this section if the Presi-  
14 dent certifies to the appropriate congressional committees  
15 not later than 15 days before such waiver is to take effect  
16 that the waiver is vital to the national security interests  
17 of the United States.

18 (g) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

19 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-  
20 ercise all authorities provided to the President under  
21 sections 203 and 205 of the International Emer-  
22 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and  
23 1704) to carry out this section.

24 (2) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in  
25 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-

1       national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50  
2       U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates,  
3       attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a  
4       violation of regulations promulgated under section  
5       403(b) to carry out paragraph (1)(A) to the same  
6       extent that such penalties apply to a person that  
7       commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a)  
8       of that Act.

9       (h) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date  
10      of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for  
11      8 years, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation  
12      with the Secretary of State and the heads of other United  
13      States Government agencies, as appropriate, shall submit  
14      to the appropriate congressional committees a report  
15      that—

16           (1) sets forth the plan of the Department of the  
17      Treasury for ensuring that property blocked pursu-  
18      ant to subsection (a) or Executive Order 14014 re-  
19      mains blocked;

20           (2) describes the primary sources of income to  
21      which the Burmese military has access and that the  
22      United States has been unable to reach using sanc-  
23      tions authorities;

1           (3) makes recommendations for how the sources  
2           of income described in paragraph (2) can be reduced  
3           or blocked;

4           (4) evaluates the implications of imposing sanc-  
5           tions on the Burmese-government owned Myanmar  
6           Oil and Gas Enterprise, including a determination  
7           with respect to the extent to which sanctions on  
8           Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise would advance the  
9           interests of the United States in Burma; and

10          (5) assesses the impact of the sanctions im-  
11          posed pursuant to the authorities under this Act on  
12          the Burmese people and the Burmese military.

13 **SEC. 5923. CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR REMOVAL**  
14 **OF CERTAIN PERSONS FROM THE LIST OF**  
15 **SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND**  
16 **BLOCKED PERSONS.**

17          (a) IN GENERAL.—On or after the date of the enact-  
18          ment of this Act, the President may not remove a person  
19          described in subsection (b) from the list of specially des-  
20          ignated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the  
21          Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the  
22          Treasury (commonly referred to as the “SDN list”) until  
23          the President submits to the appropriate congressional  
24          committees a certification described in subsection (c) with  
25          respect to the person.

1 (b) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person described in  
2 this subsection is a foreign person included in the SDN  
3 list for violations of part 525 of title 31, Code of Federal  
4 Regulations, or any other regulations imposing sanctions  
5 on or related to Burma.

6 (c) CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—A certification de-  
7 scribed in this subsection, with respect to a person de-  
8 scribed in subsection (b), is a certification that the person  
9 has not knowingly assisted in, sponsored, or provided fi-  
10 nancial, material, or technological support for, or financial  
11 or other services to or in support of—

12 (1) terrorism or a terrorist organization;

13 (2) a significant foreign narcotics trafficker (as  
14 defined in section 808 of the Foreign Narcotics  
15 Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1907));

16 (3) a significant transnational criminal organi-  
17 zation under Executive Order 13581 (50 U.S.C.  
18 note; relating to blocking property of transnational  
19 criminal organizations); or

20 (4) any other person on the SDN list.

21 (d) FORM.—A certification described in subsection  
22 (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include  
23 a classified annex.

1   **SEC. 5924. SANCTIONS AND POLICY COORDINATION FOR**  
2                   **BURMA.**

3           (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may des-  
4   ignate an official of the Department of State to serve as  
5   the United States Special Coordinator for Burmese De-  
6   mocracy (in this section referred to as the “Special Coordi-  
7   nator”).

8           (b) CENTRAL OBJECTIVE.—The Special Coordinator  
9   should develop a comprehensive strategy for the implemen-  
10   tation of the full range of United States diplomatic capa-  
11   bilities, including the provisions of this Act, to promote  
12   human rights and the restoration of civilian government  
13   in Burma.

14          (c) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special  
15   Coordinator should, as appropriate, assist in—

16               (1) coordinating the sanctions policies of the  
17       United States under section 5922 with relevant bu-  
18       reaus and offices within the Department of State  
19       and other relevant United States Government agen-  
20       cies;

21               (2) conducting relevant research and vetting of  
22       entities and individuals that may be subject to sanc-  
23       tions under section 5922 and coordinate with other  
24       United States Government agencies and inter-  
25       national financial intelligence units to assist in ef-



1        forts to enforce anti-money laundering and anti-cor-  
2        ruption laws and regulations;

3            (3) promoting a comprehensive international ef-  
4        fort to impose and enforce multilateral sanctions  
5        with respect to Burma;

6            (4) coordinating with and supporting inter-  
7        agency United States Government efforts, including  
8        efforts of the United States Ambassador to Burma,  
9        the United States Ambassador to ASEAN, and the  
10       United States Permanent Representative to the  
11       United Nations, relating to—

12            (A) identifying opportunities to coordinate  
13        with and exert pressure on the governments of  
14        the People's Republic of China and the Russian  
15        Federation to support multilateral action  
16        against the Burmese military;

17            (B) working with like-minded partners to  
18        impose a coordinated arms embargo on the  
19        Burmese military and targeted sanctions on the  
20        economic interests of the Burmese military, in-  
21        cluding through the introduction and adoption  
22        of a United Nations Security Council resolu-  
23        tion;

24            (C) engaging in direct dialogue with Bur-  
25        mese civil society, democracy advocates, ethnic

1 minority representative groups, and organiza-  
2 tions or groups representing the protest move-  
3 ment and the officials elected in 2020, such as  
4 the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu  
5 Hluttaw, the National Unity Government, the  
6 National Unity Consultative Council, and their  
7 designated representatives;

8 (D) encouraging the National Unity Gov-  
9 ernment to incorporate accountability mecha-  
10 nisms in relation to the atrocities against  
11 Rohingya and other ethnic groups, to take fur-  
12 ther steps to make its leadership and member-  
13 ship ethnically diverse, and to incorporate  
14 measures to enhance ethnic reconciliation and  
15 national unity into its policy agenda;

16 (E) assisting efforts by the relevant United  
17 Nations Special Envoys and Special  
18 Rapporteurs to secure the release of all political  
19 prisoners in Burma, promote respect for human  
20 rights, and encourage dialogue; and

21 (F) supporting nongovernmental organiza-  
22 tions operating in Burma and neighboring  
23 countries working to restore civilian democratic  
24 rule to Burma and to address the urgent hu-  
25 manitarian needs of the people of Burma; and

1           (5) providing timely input for reporting on the  
2           impacts of the implementation of section 5922 on  
3           the Burmese military and the people of Burma.

4           (d) DEADLINE.—If the Secretary of State has not  
5           designated the Special Coordinator by the date that is 180  
6           days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-  
7           retary shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs  
8           of the House of Representatives and the Committee on  
9           Foreign Relations of the Senate a report detailing the rea-  
10          sons for not doing so.

11   **SEC. 5925. SUPPORT FOR GREATER UNITED NATIONS AC-**  
12                           **TION WITH RESPECT TO BURMA.**

13          (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
14          gress that—

15               (1) the United Nations Security Council has  
16               not taken adequate steps to condemn the February  
17               1, 2021, coup in Burma, pressure the Burmese mili-  
18               tary to cease its violence against civilians, or secure  
19               the release of those unjustly detained; and

20               (2) countries, such as the People’s Republic of  
21               China and the Russian Federation, that are directly  
22               or indirectly shielding the Burmese military from  
23               international scrutiny and action, should be obliged  
24               to endure the reputational damage of doing so by  
25               taking public votes on resolutions related to Burma

1       that apply greater pressure on the Burmese military  
2       to restore Burma to its democratic path.

3           (3) The United Nations Secretariat and the  
4       United Nations Security Council should take con-  
5       crete steps to address the coup and ongoing crisis in  
6       Burma consistent with the UN General Assembly  
7       resolution 75/287, “The situation in Myanmar,”  
8       which was adopted on June 18, 2021.

9       (b) SUPPORT FOR GREATER ACTION.—The President  
10      shall direct the United States Permanent Representative  
11      to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence  
12      of the United States to spur greater action by the United  
13      Nations and the United Nations Security Council with re-  
14      spect to Burma by—

15           (1) pushing the United Nations Security Coun-  
16      cil to consider a resolution condemning the February  
17      1, 2021, coup and calling on the Burmese military  
18      to cease its violence against the people of Burma  
19      and release without preconditions the journalists,  
20      pro-democracy activists, and political officials that it  
21      has unjustly detained;

22           (2) pushing the United Nations Security Coun-  
23      cil to consider a resolution that immediately imposes  
24      a global arms embargo against Burma to ensure  
25      that the Burmese military is not able to obtain

1 weapons and munitions from other nations to fur-  
2 ther harm, murder, and oppress the people of  
3 Burma;

4 (3) pushing the United Nations and other  
5 United Nations authorities to cut off assistance to  
6 the Government of Burma while providing humani-  
7 tarian assistance directly to the people of Burma  
8 through UN bodies and civil society organizations,  
9 particularly such organizations working with ethnic  
10 minorities that have been adversely affected by the  
11 coup and the Burmese military's violent crackdown;

12 (4) objecting to the appointment of representa-  
13 tives to the United Nations and United Nations bod-  
14 ies such as the Human Rights Council that are  
15 sanctioned by the Burmese military;

16 (5) working to ensure the Burmese military is  
17 not recognized as the legitimate government of  
18 Burma in any United Nations body; and

19 (6) spurring the United Nations Security Coun-  
20 cil to consider multilateral sanctions against the  
21 Burmese military for its atrocities against Rohingya  
22 and individuals of other ethnic and religious minori-  
23 ties, its coup, and the crimes against humanity it  
24 has and continues to commit in the coup's after-  
25 math.

1 **SEC. 5926. SUNSET.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The authority to impose sanctions  
3 and the sanctions imposed under this title shall terminate  
4 on the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment  
5 of this Act.

6 (b) CERTIFICATION FOR EARLY SUNSET OF SANC-  
7 TIONS.—Sanctions imposed under this title may be re-  
8 moved before the date specified in subsection (a), if the  
9 President submits to the appropriate congressional com-  
10 mittees a certification that—

11 (1) the Burmese military has released all polit-  
12 ical prisoners taken into custody on or after Feb-  
13 ruary 1, 2021, or is providing legal recourse to those  
14 that remain in custody;

15 (2) the elected government has been reinstated  
16 or new free and fair elections have been held;

17 (3) all legal charges against those winning elec-  
18 tion in November 2020 are dropped; and

19 (4) the 2008 constitution of Burma has been  
20 amended or replaced to place the Burmese military  
21 under civilian oversight and ensure that the Bur-  
22 mese military no longer automatically receives 25  
23 percent of seats in Burma’s state, regional, and na-  
24 tional Hluttaws.

1 **Subtitle C—Humanitarian Assist-**  
2 **ance and Civil Society Support**  
3 **With Respect to Burma**

4 **SEC. 5931. SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND INDEPENDENT**  
5 **MEDIA.**

6 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE SUPPORT.—The  
7 Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United  
8 States Agency for International Development are author-  
9 ized to provide support to civil society in Burma, Ban-  
10 gladesh, Thailand, and the surrounding region, including  
11 by—

12 (1) ensuring the safety of democracy activists,  
13 civil society leaders, independent media, participants  
14 in the Civil Disobedience Movement, and government  
15 defectors exercising their fundamental rights by—

16 (A) supporting safe houses for those under  
17 threat of arbitrary arrest or detention;

18 (B) providing access to secure channels for  
19 communication;

20 (C) assisting individuals forced to flee from  
21 Burma and take shelter in neighboring coun-  
22 tries, including in ensuring protection assist-  
23 ance and non-refoulement; and

24 (D) providing funding to organizations  
25 that equip activists, civil society organizations,

1 and independent media with consistent, long-  
2 term technical support on physical and digital  
3 security in local languages;

4 (2) supporting democracy activists in their ef-  
5 forts to promote freedom, democracy, and human  
6 rights in Burma, by—

7 (A) providing aid and training to democ-  
8 racy activists in Burma;

9 (B) providing aid to individuals and groups  
10 conducting democracy programming outside of  
11 Burma targeted at a peaceful transition to con-  
12 stitutional democracy inside Burma;

13 (C) providing aid and assistance to inde-  
14 pendent media outlets and journalists and  
15 groups working to protect internet freedom and  
16 maintain independent media;

17 (D) expanding radio and television broad-  
18 casting into Burma; and

19 (E) providing financial support to civil so-  
20 ciety organizations and nongovernmental orga-  
21 nizations led by members of ethnic and religious  
22 minority groups within Burma and its cross-  
23 border regions;



1           (3) assisting ethnic minority groups and civil  
2       society in Burma to further prospects for justice,  
3       reconciliation, and sustainable peace; and

4           (4) promoting ethnic minority inclusion and  
5       participation in political processes in Burma.

6       (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There  
7       are authorized to be appropriated \$50,000,000 to carry  
8       out the provisions of this section for each of fiscal years  
9       2023 through 2027.

10   **SEC. 5932. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND RECONCILI-**  
11                           **ATION.**

12       (a) AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN  
13       ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of State and the Adminis-  
14       trator of the United States Agency for International De-  
15       velopment are authorized to provide humanitarian assist-  
16       ance and reconciliation activities for ethnic groups and  
17       civil society organizations in Burma, Bangladesh, Thai-  
18       land, and the surrounding region, including—

19           (1) assistance for victims of violence by the  
20       Burmese military, including Rohingya and individ-  
21       uals from other ethnic minorities displaced or other-  
22       wise affected by conflict, in Burma, Bangladesh,  
23       Thailand, and the surrounding region;

24           (2) support for voluntary resettlement or repa-  
25       triation of displaced individuals in Burma, upon the

1 conclusion of genuine agreements developed and ne-  
2 gotiated with the involvement and consultation of  
3 the displaced individuals and if resettlement or repa-  
4 triation is safe, voluntary, and dignified;

5 (3) support for the promotion of ethnic and re-  
6 ligious tolerance, improving social cohesion, com-  
7 bating gender-based violence, increasing the engage-  
8 ment of women in peacebuilding, and mitigating  
9 human rights violations and abuses against children;

10 (4) support for—

11 (A) primary, secondary, and tertiary edu-  
12 cation for displaced children living in areas of  
13 Burma affected by conflict; and

14 (B) refugee camps in the surrounding re-  
15 gion and opportunities to access to higher edu-  
16 cation in Bangladesh and Thailand;

17 (5) capacity-building support—

18 (A) to ensure that displaced individuals are  
19 consulted and participate in decision-making  
20 processes affecting the displaced individuals;  
21 and

22 (B) for the creation of mechanisms to fa-  
23 cilitate the participation of displaced individuals  
24 in such processes; and

1           (6) increased humanitarian aid to Burma to ad-  
2       dress the dire humanitarian situation that has up-  
3       rooted 170,000 people through—

4                   (A) international aid partners;

5                   (B) the International Committee of the  
6       Red Cross; and

7                   (C) cross-border aid.

8       (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There  
9       are authorized to be appropriated \$220,500,000 to carry  
10      out the provisions of this section for fiscal year 2023.

11   **SEC. 5933. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR BURMA**  
12                   **POLITICAL PRISONERS.**

13      (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
14      gress that—

15           (1) the freedom of expression, including for  
16      members of the press, is an inalienable right and  
17      should be upheld and protected in Burma and every-  
18      where;

19           (2) the Burmese military must immediately  
20      cease the arbitrary arrest, detention, imprisonment,  
21      and physical attacks of journalists, which have cre-  
22      ated a climate of fear and self-censorship among  
23      local journalists;

24           (3) the Government of Burma should repeal or  
25      amend all laws that violate the right to freedom of

1 expression, peaceful assembly, or association, and  
2 ensure that laws such as the Telecommunications  
3 Law of 2013 and the Unlawful Associations Act of  
4 1908, and laws relating to the right to peaceful as-  
5 sembly all comply with Burma's human rights obli-  
6 gations;

7 (4) all prisoners of conscience and political pris-  
8 oners in Burma should be unconditionally and im-  
9 mediately released;

10 (5) the Burmese military should immediately  
11 and unconditionally release Danny Fenster and  
12 other journalists unjustly detained for their work;

13 (6) the Government of Burma must imme-  
14 diately drop defamation charges against all individ-  
15 uals unjustly detained, including the three Kachin  
16 activists, Lum Zawng, Nang Pu, and Zau Jet, who  
17 led a peaceful rally in Myittha, the capital of  
18 Kachin State in April 2018, and that the prosecu-  
19 tion of Lum Zawng, Nang Pu, and Zau Jet is an  
20 attempt by Burmese authorities to intimidate, har-  
21 ass, and silence community leaders and human  
22 rights defenders who speak out about military  
23 abuses and their impact on civilian populations; and

24 (7) the United States Government should use  
25 all diplomatic tools to seek the unconditional and im-

1       mediate release of all prisoners of conscience and po-  
2       litical prisoners in Burma.

3       (b) POLITICAL PRISONERS ASSISTANCE.—The Sec-  
4       retary of State is authorized to continue to provide assist-  
5       ance to civil society organizations in Burma that work to  
6       secure the release of and support prisoners of conscience  
7       and political prisoners in Burma, including—

8               (1) support for the documentation of human  
9       rights violations with respect to prisoners of con-  
10      science and political prisoners;

11              (2) support for advocacy in Burma to raise  
12      awareness of issues relating to prisoners of con-  
13      science and political prisoners;

14              (3) support for efforts to repeal or amend laws  
15      that are used to imprison individuals as prisoners of  
16      conscience or political prisoners;

17              (4) support for health, including mental health,  
18      and post-incarceration assistance in gaining access  
19      to education and employment opportunities or other  
20      forms of reparation to enable former prisoners of  
21      conscience and political prisoners to resume normal  
22      lives; and

23              (5) the creation, in consultation with former po-  
24      litical prisoners and prisoners of conscience, their

1 families, and their representatives, of an inde-  
2 pendent prisoner review mechanism in Burma—

3 (A) to review the cases of individuals who  
4 may have been charged or deprived of their lib-  
5 erty for peacefully exercising their human  
6 rights;

7 (B) to review all laws used to arrest, pros-  
8 ecute, and punish individuals as political pris-  
9 oners and prisoners of conscience; and

10 (C) to provide recommendations to the  
11 Government of Burma for the repeal or amend-  
12 ment of all such laws.

13 (c) TERMINATION.—The authority to provide assist-  
14 ance under this section shall terminate on the date that  
15 is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

16 **Subtitle D—Accountability for**  
17 **Human Rights Abuses**

18 **SEC. 5941. REPORT ON ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES,**  
19 **CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, AND GENOCIDE**  
20 **IN BURMA.**

21 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the  
22 United States—

23 (1) to continue the support of ongoing mecha-  
24 nisms and special procedures of the United Nations  
25 Human Rights Council, including the United Na-

1        tions Independent Investigative Mechanism for  
2        Myanmar and the Special Rapporteur on the situa-  
3        tion of human rights in Myanmar; and

4            (2) to refute the credibility and impartiality of  
5        efforts sponsored by the Government of Burma, such  
6        as the Independent Commission of Enquiry, unless  
7        the United States Ambassador at Large for Global  
8        Criminal Justice determines the efforts to be cred-  
9        ible and impartial and notifies the appropriate con-  
10       gressional committees in writing and in unclassified  
11       form regarding that determination.

12       (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days  
13 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary  
14 of State, after consultation with the heads of other United  
15 States Government agencies and representatives of human  
16 rights organizations, as appropriate, shall submit to the  
17 appropriate congressional committees a report that—

18            (1) evaluates the persecution of Rohingya in  
19        Burma by the Burmese military;

20            (2) after consulting with the Atrocity Early  
21        Warning Task Force, or any successor entity or of-  
22        fice, provides a detailed description of any proposed  
23        atrocity prevention response recommended by the  
24        Task Force as it relates to Burma;

1           (3) summarizes any atrocity crimes committed  
2           against Rohingya or members of other ethnic minor-  
3           ity groups in Burma between 2012 and the date of  
4           the submission of the report;

5           (4) describes any potential transitional justice  
6           mechanisms for Burma;

7           (5) provides an analysis of whether the reports  
8           summarized under paragraph (3) amount to war  
9           crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide;

10          (6) includes an assessment on which events that  
11          took place in the state of Rakhine in Burma, start-  
12          ing on August 25, 2017, constitute war crimes,  
13          crimes against humanity, or genocide; and

14          (7) includes a determination with respect to  
15          whether events that took place during or after the  
16          coup of February 1, 2021, in any state in Burma  
17          constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity.

18          (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection  
19 (b) shall include the following:

20           (1) A description of—

21           (A) credible evidence of events that may  
22           constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity,  
23           or genocide committed by the Burmese military  
24           against Rohingya and members of other ethnic



1 minority groups, including the identities of any  
2 other actors involved in the events;

3 (B) the role of the civilian government in  
4 the commission of any events described in sub-  
5 paragraph (A);

6 (C) credible evidence of events of war  
7 crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide  
8 committed by other armed groups in Burma;

9 (D) attacks on health workers, health fa-  
10 cilities, health transport, or patients and, to the  
11 extent possible, the identities of any individuals  
12 who engaged in or organized such attacks in  
13 Burma; and

14 (E) to the extent possible, the conventional  
15 and unconventional weapons used for any  
16 events or attacks described in this paragraph  
17 and the sources of such weapons.

18 (2) In consultation with the Administrator of  
19 the United States Agency for International Develop-  
20 ment, the Attorney General, and heads of any other  
21 appropriate United States Government agencies, as  
22 appropriate, a description and assessment of the ef-  
23 fectiveness of any efforts undertaken by the United  
24 States to promote accountability for war crimes,  
25 crimes against humanity, and genocide perpetrated

1       against Rohingya by the Burmese military, the gov-  
2       ernment of the Rakhine State, pro-government mili-  
3       tias, or other armed groups operating in the  
4       Rakhine State, including efforts—

5               (A) to train civilian investigators, within  
6               and outside of Burma and Bangladesh, to docu-  
7               ment, investigate, develop findings of, identify,  
8               and locate alleged perpetrators of war crimes,  
9               crimes against humanity, or genocide in Burma;

10              (B) to promote and prepare for a transi-  
11              tional justice mechanism for the perpetrators of  
12              war crimes, crimes against humanity, and geno-  
13              cide occurring in the Rakhine State in 2017;  
14              and

15              (C) to document, collect, preserve, and pro-  
16              tect evidence of war crimes, crimes against hu-  
17              manity, and genocide in Burma, including by—

18                   (i) providing support for ethnic  
19                   Rohingya, Shan, Rakhine, Kachin, Chin,  
20                   and Kayin and other ethnic minorities;

21                   (ii) Burmese, Bangladeshi, foreign,  
22                   and international nongovernmental organi-  
23                   zations;

24                   (iii) the Independent Investigative  
25                   Mechanism for Myanmar; and

1 (iv) other entities engaged in inves-  
2 tigative activities with respect to war  
3 crimes, crimes against humanity, and  
4 genocide in Burma.

5 (3) A detailed study of the feasibility and desir-  
6 ability of a transitional justice mechanism for  
7 Burma, such as an international tribunal, a hybrid  
8 tribunal, or other options, that includes—

9 (A) a discussion of the use of universal ju-  
10 risdiction or of legal cases brought against  
11 Burma by other countries at the International  
12 Court of Justice regarding any atrocity crimes  
13 perpetrated in Burma;

14 (B) recommendations for any transitional  
15 justice mechanism the United States should  
16 support, the reason the mechanism should be  
17 supported, and the type of support that should  
18 be offered; and

19 (C) consultation regarding transitional jus-  
20 tice mechanisms with representatives of  
21 Rohingya and individuals from other ethnic mi-  
22 nority groups who have suffered human rights  
23 violations and abuses.

24 (d) PROTECTION OF WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE.—

25 The Secretary of State shall seek to ensure that the identi-

1 fication of witnesses and physical evidence used for the  
2 report required by this section are not publicly disclosed  
3 in a manner that might place witnesses at risk of harm  
4 or encourage the destruction of evidence by the military  
5 or government of Burma.

6 (e) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

7 (1) FORM.—The report required by subsection  
8 (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may  
9 include a classified annex.

10 (2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified  
11 portion of the report required by subsection (b) shall  
12 be posted on a publicly available internet website.

13 (f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-  
14 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-  
15 sional committees” means—

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and  
17 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

18 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the  
19 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-  
20 resentatives.

1 **SEC. 5942. AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL AS-**  
2 **SISTANCE FOR EFFORTS AGAINST HUMAN**  
3 **RIGHTS ABUSES.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is author-  
5 ized to provide assistance to support appropriate civilian  
6 or international entities that—

7 (1) identify suspected perpetrators of war  
8 crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide;

9 (2) collect, document, and protect evidence of  
10 crimes and preserving the chain of custody for such  
11 evidence;

12 (3) conduct criminal investigations of such  
13 crimes; and

14 (4) support investigations conducted by other  
15 countries, and by entities mandated by the United  
16 Nations, such as the Independent Investigative  
17 Mechanism for Myanmar.

18 (b) AUTHORIZATION FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  
19 MECHANISMS.—The Secretary of State, taking into ac-  
20 count any relevant findings in the report submitted under  
21 section 5942, is authorized to provide support for the es-  
22 tablishment and operation of transitional justice mecha-  
23 nisms, including a hybrid tribunal, to prosecute individuals  
24 suspected of committing war crimes, crimes against hu-  
25 manity, or genocide in Burma.

